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Minister for Foreign Affairs, during the inauguration of the EU International Relations 
and Diplomacy Studies programme at the Provincial Palace in Bruges on 15 
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The  EU Diplomacy Papers offer a platform for academic and policy-oriented 
discussions of the European Union's external relations in a broad and interdisciplinary 
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to publish their work rapidly and to make the papers available worldwide. 
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Introduction 
 
European integration is a project born from the desire to secure lasting peace 
between the peoples of Europe. From the beginning, the European Community (EC) 
underpinned the reconciliation of Western Europe, helped to increase its stability, 
raised standards of living and promoted ever closer relations between its Member 
States. Subsequently, through development cooperation, external assistance 
programmes and through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the 
growing European Union (EU) has been seeking to project stability and lasting peace 
not only within but also beyond its borders. 
 
However, the European Union is currently navigating stormy waters. More than 
before, there are major doubts and disagreements about the future direction the 
European Union should take. Against this troubled backdrop positive steps are 
necessary to reverse the negative state of mind. 
 
European citizens expect the EU to use its substantial international influence to 
protect and promote their interests. Conversely, the rest of the world expects Europe 
to pull a greater weight in international affairs. In living up to these expectations, the 
European Security Strategy (adopted in December 2003) argues that the impact of 
the EU as a whole can be much higher than the sum of its component parts, in other 
words the isolated actions of Commission, Council and individual Member States.  
 
The EC has outgrown the time when its external competence was limited to trade. 
Development cooperation policies have gained a lot of weight; agreements can be 
concluded on migration and movement of persons as much as on imports and 
exports; and there is a broad external competence in matters of environmental 
policy, social policy and monetary policy. CFSP is to serve as a multiplier for EU 
influence, through concrete actions notably in the fields of conflict prevention, crisis 
management, peacekeeping, peacemaking and disaster response.  
 
Belgium has always been a staunch advocate of a political Europe and at the 
forefront of promoting the Community method and of strengthening the 
competences of the European Commission. In the run-up to the Maastricht Summit 
(December 1991), the Benelux countries already favoured a unified treaty structure EU Diplomacy Papers 1/2006 
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and the incorporation of all dimensions of European foreign policy under the 
umbrella of the EC. In December 2002, European Convention Working Group VII on 
External Action noted considerable support for the full merger of the functions of the 
High Representative into to European Commission (so-called option 2). This option 
enjoyed Belgium’s full support.  
 
This merger would provide a single centre for policy preparation in the field of 
external action (including CFSP), which would be situated in the Commission. 
Decision-making would remain in the hands of the European Council and the 
Council of Ministers. The Commission would be responsible for policy initiation and 
implementation, as well as for external representation in all areas of Union external 
action. There would be one single administration and full parliamentary control. The 
merger would not cover issues related to ESDP, which would be subject to a different 
arrangement. 
 
I still do believe that applying the Community method to foreign policy is the "first 
best" option. However, it serves no purpose to be blind to political reality. In 2006, it is 
still clearly the case that a majority of member states refuses to grant the Commission 
the same role in foreign and security policy matters as in, say, internal market 
matters.  
 
Achievements 
 
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (May 1999), and the decisions 
taken at the European Councils of Cologne (June 1999), Helsinki (December 1999), 
Feira (June 2000) and Nice (December 2000), CFSP, European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP), as well as external relations under the first pillar, have developed with 
extraordinary speed.  
 
Clear evidence can be seen in the multiplication of initiatives and actions in 
response to different crises and conflicts, the adoption of political orientations with 
increasing operational implications, the development of an (autonomous) sanctions 
policy, the negotiation of a variety of association agreements an development, 
assistance or partnership programmes with third countries, the strengthened 
cooperation with international or regional organisations (i.a. UN, NATO, OSCE and Karel De Gucht 
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African Union), the elaboration of Common Strategies on the fight against terrorism, 
the proliferation of small arms or weapons of mass destruction, as well as the 
endorsement of detailed guidelines on the promotion and defence of human rights. 
 
The European Security Strategy – "A Secure Europe in a Better World" – (adopted in 
December 2003) constitutes an important milestone. This guiding document identifies 
the major security challenges facing the EU and its Member States, and sets out clear 
priorities for EU Foreign Policy. The successful conduct of operations Artemis in the DR 
Congo (first autonomous military ESDP operation) and Proxima in fYROM (first civilian 
ESDP operation) has sparked a positive dynamic for the development of crisis 
management procedures, instruments and capabilities. Today, the EU is engaged in 
theatres as diverse as Africa, the Western Balkans, the Middle East and in Aceh 
(Indonesia). 
 
The nomination of Javier Solana as High Representative for the CFSP has marked the 
collective ambition of EU Member States. The function of the High Representative 
also introduces some prudent elements of the Community method. Although the 
High Representative does not have an exclusive right of initiative, his guidance and 
recommendations can foster a common basis for foreign policy actions. 
 
Javier Solana has conducted talks with the Iranian authorities on the Iranian nuclear 
programme. In June of this year, he submitted to Teheran a package proposal by 
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. This mission 
by the High Representative and its backing by the United State, Russia and China 
should not be underestimated in the context of EU Foreign Policy. 
 
At the same time, EC instruments (inter alia association, partnership and other 
agreements) have proven to be very valuable tools to promote stability and peace 
in the world. Political dialogue with third countries and regions, has become 
meaningful because they build on the appeal of first pillar external policies, such as 
trade policy, development policy and financial support.  
 
The following quote by former Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, 
taken from his book "Not Quite the Diplomat", describes vividly how the first and 
second pillar can work in concert to effectively deliver policy:  EU Diplomacy Papers 1/2006 
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"Solana was the representative of all of the foreign ministers; I had charge of the 
Commission’s external services – development and cooperation programmes, and 
the coordination of all the activities that had a major bearing on other countries. As 
far as I was concerned, Solana occupied the front office and I was in charge of the 
back office of European foreign policy … But at least in the back office, the levers 
were connected to machinery; pull them and something normally happened, if 
sometimes too slowly." 
 
Shortcomings 
 
Remarkable though recent progress has been, a sober look at European foreign 
affairs in general still prompts the conclusion that it remains hard for the EU to 
develop a forceful, active policy. Why is that so? The following factors explain a 
great deal. 
 
To start with, there are the limitations of the three-pillar system of the EU. This system 
leads to problems of horizontal inconsistency between the first and second pillar. 
Major constraints reside in the inability to mobilise EC instruments for specific foreign 
policy objectives. The recent Court case on "small arms and light weapons in the 
framework of ECOWAS" further complicates the formulation of a genuine EU Foreign 
Policy drawing on all available instruments (first, second and third pillar).  
 
The pillar structure also leads to inadequate budgetary resources to finance the 
future development of CFSP and the growing number of civilian ESDP operations. 
Expenditure associated with the external actions is governed by different rules, 
depending on the legal base within the first or the second pillar. This situation 
seriously hampers both the consistency and the effectiveness of EU external action. 
 
Belgium – supported by a large majority of Member States – has pleaded in favour of 
an increase of the CFSP budget from €62 million in 2005 to €102,6 million in 2006. 
Under the financial perspective 2007-2013 the annual CFSP budget will increase from 
€120 million to €250 million. In determining the appropriate level of the CFSP budget, 
two fundamental principles should be kept in mind: 1) budgetary resources should 
follow objective foreign policy needs, not the other way around, and 2) adequate Karel De Gucht 
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"common" budgetary resources are necessary to underpin geographical solidarity 
among Member States with diverging foreign policy priorities. 
 
The rise of the CFSP budget in coming years is undisputed, but it remains doubtful 
whether what Council and Parliament have agreed upon will prove adequate. For 
instance, next year a financial crunch is unavoidable if the EU is to launch the largest 
civilian ESDP operation ever in Kosovo. 
 
Alternatively, one could revisit the groundbreaking proposal by the Commission for 
financing the ESDP operation in Aceh. The Commission stood ready to align the 
support it delivered through first pillar instruments with the political framework agreed 
under CFSP. Unfortunately, this proposal was withdrawn after a bitter confrontation 
with the legal service of the Council and two Member States.  
 
Secondly, there is also the problem of vertical inconsistency, or the inadequate 
support from national diplomacies for EU foreign policy, despite the clear obligations 
stemming from Articles 11 and 19 of the Treaty. Strengthening of EU foreign policy is 
too often perceived as a zero-sum game with loss of national influence and prestige. 
EU policy and national policies towards important international partners, such as the 
US, Russia, China highlights this point. 
 
A third important obstacle – that is often overlooked – is the lack of interest Member 
States have in EU foreign policy-making. Diverging foreign policy objectives on key 
international issues are one part of the explanation, where obviously the case of Iraq 
comes to mind. With regard to foreign policy issues slightly lower on the international 
agenda, say Somalia, Guinea Bissau or East Timor, only a few Member States – due 
to historical, geographic, economic or other reasons – may be keenly interested in 
active EU foreign policy, whereas the majority favours not to get involved. This leads 
to a conspiracy of indifference and undermines the legitimacy and relevance of EU 
foreign policy for the political elite and population in those interested Member 
States.  
 
A fourth and final challenge for EU foreign policy is the tendency toward the creation 
of "directoires" and other restricted groups of member states that act outside or at 
the margins of the EU framework. EU Diplomacy Papers 1/2006 
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In many cases, the creation of these groups is the result of member states’ frustration, 
when their demand for a more active European foreign policy has been rejected. 
When others are not able or willing to come up with the required financial and 
human resources, some decide to take the lead and go it alone. This is positive, as 
this is often the only possible way forward. 
 
However, in some important files, there has been the inclination of the largest 
member states to form a "directoire" and to formulate amongst them foreign policy. 
This is in itself should not be worrisome. It becomes a serious cause for concern when 
a small group of countries define EU foreign policy, having regard to EU instruments.  
 
The Contribution of the Constitution 
 
The shadow cast over the future of the Constitution hangs over the further 
development of EU Foreign Policy as well. The Constitution would allow for a better 
articulation of different external policy areas and would introduce new elements of 
the Community method into CFSP. However, it falls short of solving some of the 
problems I just listed. 
 
The most valuable contribution the Constitution would make is the introduction of a 
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and the creation of a supporting European External 
Action Service. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs/Vice-President of the 
Commission would be key to ensuring horizontal consistency of EU foreign 
policymaking and external actions under the first and second pillar. He or she would 
be in a strong position as he/she would chair the Council and oversee CFSP 
implementation.   
 
Shifting EU Foreign Policy into Higher Gear 
 
Having taken so far a bird’s eye view on the current state of EU Foreign Policy, I now 
want to turn our attention to some small, practical steps, which together could shift 
EU Foreign Policy into higher gear.  
 Karel De Gucht 
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What steps could be taken to tackle some of the shortcomings I referred to earlier, 
without compromising the advances in foreign policy the Constitutional Treaty holds 
in store? 
 
The Finnish EU Presidency has proposed a series of possible measures to increase the 
efficiency, coherence and visibility of EU external policies. Allow me to highlight the 
most eye-catching items: wider use of qualified majority in CFSP according to Article 
23 of the Treaty; having the same person serving as Head of the Commission 
delegation and EU Special Representative; more personnel exchanges in capitals 
and abroad between national diplomatic services, and the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat; more exchanges of analyses and reports; common visa 
application centres and closer consular cooperation, including in crisis situations.  
 
I can subscribe wholeheartedly to these suggestions. In addition, I believe it would 
also be worthwhile examining the following measures: reinforcing the mandate of 
the SG/HR to represent the Council, in particular in crisis management situations or 
on specific issues, and to conduct political dialogues in accordance with Article 26 
of the TEU; reinforcing the support of the Commission to ESDP actions and missions, 
through the stability instrument (flanking measures); and reinforcing the support of 
the Commission to Special Representatives of the EU during their missions in the field. 
 
To this Finnish list of proposed measures, may be added the internal "housekeeping" 
changes announced by the Commission in its recent Communication to the 
European Council and by Mr. Solana in his Hampton Court follow-up letter.  
 
Relations of the EU with a third country or region are by definition multidimensional. 
Therefore, an institutionalised coordination and cooperation between Relex 
Commissioners and the High Representative is indispensable, but also between Relex 
Commissioners and Commissioners in charge of internal policies with a growing 
external dimension, for example environment, justice and home affairs and research 
and technology.  
 
The High Representative made valuable proposals for the strengthening of the 
Council Secretariat’s ESDP structures. I would, underscore the importance of closely 
associating the Commission in different aspects of Crisis Management. The main task, EU Diplomacy Papers 1/2006 
  10
however, is now up to the Member States, who have to live up to the goals they 
have set themselves, especially the attainment of the civilian Headline Goals of 2008 
– mobilising policemen, rule of law experts, civil administrators, and civil protection 
experts – and the military Headline Goals of 2010, including the rapid reaction Battle 
Groups. In this respect, a number of Member States, including Belgium, still have 
quite some way to go and need to commit more expenditure on military and police 
manpower and equipment. 
 
Additionally, more, and more collaborative, outlays on military R&D and capabilities, 
such as strategic airlifts, should be made through the European Defence Agency. 
Otherwise, a competitive defence industry in Europe may not be sustainable.   
 
The second and third obstacle confronting EU foreign policy that I mentioned earlier 
hinge on the lack of support from or interest of Member States. To address these, 
there is a need for a mechanism that allows us to both safeguard the Community 
method and recognize the important role of some individual member states in 
specific foreign policy matters. In a speech in Helsinki last year I proposed to this end 
the establishment of "EU Liaising Groups" that would build on previous experience 
with the "EU Core Group for Somalia".   
 
Such a liaising group would consist of the High Representative (or his Special 
Representative or a diplomat of the Secretariat-General), the European Commission, 
the Presidency, and a group of member states that are able and willing to devote 
extra diplomatic efforts and national resources to a particular foreign policy matter. 
The full membership of the EU institutions and actors will provide the guarantee that 
the common interest of the EU as a whole is respected. 
 
The formula of EU Liaising Groups may be used for the many foreign policy domains 
that do not top the international agenda. However, it should clearly be excluded for 
crucial and well-established EU foreign policy domains, such as the Western Balkans, 
the Middle East, transatlantic relations, and relations with Russia, as well as for foreign 
policy matters subject to major disagreements. 
 
The main task of a EU Liaising Group would be to promote a more dynamic, 
coherent and (pro)active policy towards a specific policy area or issue: 1) through its Karel De Gucht 
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support for the preparation, elaboration & implementation of the policy of the EU, 
and 2) through the intensification and pooling of the national efforts of the states 
that participate in the Liaising Group.   
 
The High Representative or one of his aides would need to chair the meetings of the 
EU Group, in order to reconcile specialisation and coherence. He would be 
responsible for giving feedback to the Council and EP, and for ensuring that the 
activities of the liaising group do not affect the competences of the Council, 
Commission or Parliament and respect the existing EU policies towards the foreign 
policy issue. 
 
None of these small steps is likely to reach the front page of the press. However, if 
implemented, they would together make a substantial contribution to reinforcing 
European foreign policy. 
 
For any policy to be effective, there must be means to ends. EU foreign policy is no 
exception to this simple rule. The following months and years must be used to make 
sure that the EU can draw on all foreign policy levers that enable prompt and 
credible intervention, be it money, legal instruments and procedures, people and 
hardware. Belgium will do its utmost.  
 